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Money, Speech,
and Chutzpah
JOEL M. GORA
The author is a professor at Brooklyn Law School and formerly a longtime lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union.

As a young boy growing up in a working-class family in a mostly
Jewish neighborhood of Los Angeles, I learned that the word
“chutzpah” had two different and opposite meanings. The positive one was a synonym for courage or moxie or fearlessness,
as in the chutzpah to take on established authority. Think of
Lenny Bruce, the great comic scourge of the establishment or
of the cases recounted in Alan Dershowitz’s book called, simply,
Chutzpah. The other meaning has a negative connotation, as in
gall or nerve or effrontery, or perhaps even duplicity. Think of
the example of the defendant who murders his parents and then
seeks the mercy of the court on the ground that he is an orphan.
In the decades-old battle over whether campaign finance
limitations violate free speech principles, I think there has been
a good deal of chutzpah of both kinds. In the interests of full
disclosure, I should note that I have been involved in challenging campaign finance restrictions—on the ground they are fundamental violations of free speech principles—for most of my
professional career, both as an American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) lawyer and as a Brooklyn Law School professor. So it
will come as no surprise to hear that, in my view, those who
champion limitations on campaign funding have a lot of nerve
to insist that the way to improve democracy is by limiting free
speech. Conversely, those hearty souls, fewer in number but no
less passionate in purpose, who have challenged these restrictions have manifested the admirable form of chutzpah in the

decades-long battles, ranging from the 1976 landmark decision
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), to the more recent controversial ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
558 U.S. 310 (2010). That positive form of chutzpah says, “What
part of ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech’ do you not understand?” It asks why we should trust,
let alone defer to, the judgment of elected incumbent politicians
who are writing rules governing their reelections and limiting
the free speech of their challengers and their critics. From the
beginning, the battle over campaign finance restrictions has pitted the Davids of candidates, parties, and independent groups
against the Goliaths of government who would pass laws making
it a crime to spend money to criticize them, aided and abetted
by major media allies and well-funded “reform” groups who
support such laws. Talk about chutzpah. In my view, it took the
bad kind of chutzpah for the people in power to pass those laws
and the good kind for those who challenged them over the years.

The First Heroes
Take, for example, Randolph K. Phillips, Richard A. Falk, Robert
J. Bobrick, Elizabeth A. Most, Alfred Hassler, Ron Young, and
Ernest Gruening. They are the first heroes in the modern free
speech war against campaign finance restrictions. They were a
small band of left-wing activists convinced that then president
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Richard Nixon had committed war crimes by his conduct of the
war in southeast Asia. So they formed the National Committee
for Impeachment. In the spring of 1972, they ponied up enough
money to run a two-page ad in the New York Times detailing
the allegations against the president and praising a handful
of like-minded members of Congress who had sponsored an
impeachment resolution against him. In a country with a First
Amendment and a commitment to democracy, one would have
thought that the people engaged in these activities would have
received some kind of good citizenship award. Instead, they
received a visit from agents of the U.S. government, which sued
to shut the group down, claiming that the ad violated the brandnew Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972 (FECA), the ink on
which was not even dry. Why? Because it was an election year,
and the ad might somehow affect people’s thinking about these
issues and might thereby affect how they would vote in the 1972
elections and thereby “influence the outcome” of the elections.
And because the group had run the ad without seeking the permission of the candidates the ad might help, as required by the
brand-new law’s limits on media expenditures supporting or
opposing candidates for federal office, not to mention failing
to form a political committee, file reports, and disclose their
contributors and supporters—even though they proudly affixed
their names to the newspaper advertisement—they would have
to cease their free speech until they complied with the new law.
At first glance, it seemed hard to believe that a proceeding like
this could be brought, given the strong protection of political
speech that the liberal Warren Court had established. And this
seemed the clearest example of protected political speech that
the government could not prohibit, limit, or license.
The antiwar group leaders reached out to the ACLU to represent them in defending this case. When we began to review it,
we were stunned that the government would bring it and at the
provisions of the new law that authorized the attempt to silence
these critics of government. These laws were sold as “reforming”
our elections. By silencing criticism of government? Some reform
that turned out to be. Happily, we were successful in defending
the group by persuading the federal appeals court in New York
to rule that the new campaign finance law was not intended to
and should not be applied to issue-oriented speech that commented on the critical questions of the day and appropriately
criticized politicians in the course of doing so.
But as we learned more about the new FECA law in order
to defend the impeachment group, the law’s overbreadth and
vagueness became immediately apparent, as did its prior restraint mechanism. It effectively sought to control any money
spent “for the purpose of influencing the . . . election . . . of any
person to federal office,” which, in an election year, could extend
to any money spent to criticize the incumbents running the government who were up for reelection. The ACLU, like countless

other cause organizations, could find itself running afoul of the
law for its criticism of the civil liberties stance of elected officials,
despite the ACLU’s historic and absolute nonpartisan status.
The ACLU felt compelled to bring its own lawsuit against
the new campaign finance law on the ground that it unconstitutionally could suppress the group’s nonpartisan criticism of
government and the politicians who run it. It was now the fall
of that 1972 election year, and the ACLU wanted to criticize
President Nixon’s opposition to busing to enforce school integration and support members of Congress who had opposed his
position. But the threat of the law being applied to us stood in
the way. We filed suit in the federal court in Washington, D.C.,
back in the day when you needed a three-judge federal court to
consider the constitutionality of a federal statute. The threejudge court scheduled a hearing for late on a Friday afternoon in
October, and I remember taking the Metroliner to Washington,
D.C., accompanying one of the ACLU’s senior counsel, Marvin
Karpatkin, who would be representing us in that hearing. As
the train neared the nation’s capital, we found ourselves marveling at a legal system that would provide a fair judicial forum
for a group of citizens to sue the government for violation of
their fundamental First Amendment rights and demand that the
government explain the reasons for such censorship. It seemed
it would take a lot of, shall we say, chutzpah for us to do that. But
our marvelous judicial system, with its independent judiciary,
provided the mechanism that enabled us to do so. (Karpatkin
certainly did not lack chutzpah. As a prominent litigator in military draft cases, he argued before the Supreme Court challenging
the conviction of an anti-war protester who burned his draft card
in dissent against the war in Vietnam. Unfortunately, the Court
ruled against him in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).)
The three-judge court was very responsive to our arguments
that afternoon, and it felt as though the meaning and purpose
of the First Amendment had come alive in that Washington,
D.C., courtroom. The court granted the ACLU a preliminary
injunction to run its issue advertisement criticizing or praising
incumbent politicians during an election season and went on
thereafter to hold that the law requiring permission to speak out
about politicians was an impermissible prior restraint and one
that could not be imposed on nonpartisan issue organizations.

After Watergate
Those two rulings would certainly have cleared the way for the
ACLU and the myriad other cause organizations in America to
continue to criticize politicians free from fear of restraint under the campaign finance laws. But then came the Watergate
scandals. Although only some matters involved campaign finance irregularities—misconduct that either was already illegal
under existing law or occurred before effective disclosure of
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contributions had been implemented—that served as the excuse
for a massive expansion of the campaign finance controls. The
new law, passed in the fall of 1974, was an across-the-board effort
by the federal government to regulate political speech through
limiting and controlling its funding. It set severe limits on political contributions and expenditures by candidates, parties,
and independent groups; it imposed draconian new reporting
and disclosure requirements designed to silence nonpartisan
groups; and it set up a new agency to enforce this regime totally
controlled by the incumbent politicians in the Congress and the
White House. And this was all done in the name of reforming
the political process. Talk about chutzpah.
Once again, a small group of outsiders had the courage to say,
“No, this will not stand. This effort to control political speech
as thoroughly as the condemned Alien and Sedition Laws of
an earlier era will not go unchallenged.” Led by an odd couple of outsiders—James Buckley, the conservative U.S. Senator
from New York, and the liberal, antiwar icon, Senator Eugene
McCarthy of Minnesota—a strange bedfellows coalition of outsiders came together to challenge the law. They included the New
York Civil Liberties Union, headed by Ira Glasser, and a number
of other liberal and conservative cause organizations and thirdparty groups, including the Libertarian Party; the conservative
magazine Human Rights; the Mississippi Republican Party; and
Stewart Mott, a wealthy General Motors heir who had lavishly
backed a number of left-wing causes. Taken as a whole, their
complaint was that the new laws were systematic violations of
the freedoms of speech, press, association, and petition safeguarded at the core of the First Amendment. At the same time,
they were incumbent protection devices designed to preserve the
power of the status quo and the entrenched political and media
establishment, by denying outside voices the wherewithal to get
their dissident messages out. (Oh, if we had only had Twitter
back then.) Thus was the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo born.
The omnibus complaint against the new campaign finance
law was first heard by the entire D.C. Circuit, in an exceptional
en banc proceeding that was provided for in the new law in
order to allow its immediate challenge. The suit was filed the
first day the law went into effect. Our team was led by then Yale
Law School professor Ralph K. Winter Jr., who would go on to
an extremely distinguished career on the Second Circuit, and
by Brice Clagett, a major litigating partner at the Washington
powerhouse firm of Covington and Burling, ably assisted by
John R. Bolton, then a young associate who would also go on to
an extremely distinguished career in politics and public service.
Except for the fact that we were working out of Covington’s
fancy law firm offices, we felt like decided outsiders up against
a legal, political, and media establishment that had vouched for
the constitutionality and necessity of the law. David and Goliath
once again. It did seem that we had a lot of nerve challenging

what was heralded as such a solid gold law. And, indeed, the
proceedings in the D.C. Circuit seemed to vindicate the law and
its defenders, with a ruling that upheld every provision of the
law except one—a section that would have required groups like
the ACLU to disclose their members and contributors as the
price of criticizing elected officials during an election year. It
has always been a source of pride for me that I was responsible
for arguing that part of the case, which provided the one bright
spot of victory in the en banc court decision.
It was always clear that the case would go to the Supreme
Court on an exceptionally fast track, and it did. Once again, we
felt like long-shot underdogs, with so much of the Establishment
on the other side of our challenge. During the argument at the
Court—another exceptional moment, the whole day set aside for
argument on the one case—luminaries like Senator Ted Kennedy
and others who had championed the law were prominently seated in the first row of the distinguished guests section of the
courtroom. But once the arguments began, and as we started
hearing the kinds of skeptical questions many of the justices
were directing at the lawyers defending the law—questions we
had been raising from the beginning of the case and to little
avail—we felt for the first time in the litigation that our arguments were getting the fair hearing they deserved. Once again, it
seemed the nerve of those enacting such a questionable law was
being met by the courage of those with the chutzpah to challenge
it. At the end of the day of oral argument, we had the feeling
that, win or lose, for the first time the severe First Amendment
concerns raised by the law were being taken seriously.

The Landmark Buckley Decision
As is well known, the Court’s landmark 1976 Buckley decision
ruled decisively, for the first time, that limitations on the funding of political speech were limitations on that speech itself and
subject to the most careful First Amendment scrutiny. Limits
on spending failed that test, as did limits on issue advocacy
by groups and individuals. Limits on giving to candidates and
parties were upheld on the theory—mistaken in my view—that
they were necessary to avoid corruption or the appearance of
corruption, concerns that we challengers had argued could
be addressed adequately and less drastically by disclosure of
large contributions and enforcement of conflict-of-interest and
bribery laws. But to those of us who a few years earlier, in the
impeachment advertisement case, had strenuously insisted,
when few others concurred, that limits on political funding
were limits on political speech, the Court’s confirmation of
that view was gratifying, as was the Court’s reaffirmation of
core First Amendment principles. For the next 25 years, the
Buckley framework would govern campaign finance laws and
result in Court decisions tending to strike down provisions that

Published in Litigation, Volume 43, Number 4, Summer 2017. © 2017 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not
be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

50

limited spending, while upholding those that limited giving to
candidates and parties.
As we had predicted in our arguments to the Court in Buckley,
any Solomon-like splitting of the decision would lead individuals and groups to use their resources to get out their message in
ways not involving direct contributions to candidates or to benefit candidates. The result was a lot of donations of “soft money”
to political parties for their generic activities as well as spending
of funds independently by corporations and labor unions for issue advocacy that skirted direct endorsement of candidates but
could have an impact on elections. To “close these loopholes,”
Congress passed the McCain-Feingold bill, which outlawed any
raising or spending of soft money by any political parties even
to be used for things like get-out-the-vote campaigns. All corrupting, said Congress. Even worse, the law made it a crime for
any corporation—including all of the nonprofit cause organizations in America—or any labor union to spend any funds speaking out, on broadcast or similar media, for or against politicians
during an election season, or even mentioning their names. To
make the First Amendment insult even greater, the corporate
news media were specifically exempted from this statutory gag
order. To paraphrase George Orwell, all groups are equal, but
some groups are more equal than others. As the powerful dissent of the late Justice Antonin Scalia would point out, it took
an unusual amount of chutzpah for the Congress to pass this
law, which was the ultimate incumbent protection measure. It
censored the political parties—who most often support challengers to incumbents—and it censored those powerful independent
groups—corporations, nonprofit organizations, and unions—who
most frequently criticized incumbents. Not to mention that the
First Amendment seems to say that Congress cannot do that:
“Congress shall make no law,” and all that.
The law was challenged by another strange bedfellows coalition, which had the American Federation of Labor–Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) marching side by side with
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the ACLU joining forces
with the National Rifle Association (NRA), all in opposition
to this law that silenced all of them and the tens of millions of
Americans they represent. They disagreed on so many policy
matters, but they all agreed that the new law was a direct affront to the First Amendment. It was a coalition assembled under
the leadership of Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, and it
included, as one of the plaintiffs, the current vice president of
the United States, Mike Pence, then a member of the House of
Representatives. This was certainly not a small band of outsiders
like the Buckley plaintiffs. Rather, it was key participants in the
political process insisting that the law was designed to silence
them and empower their political adversaries, who had been the
ones who pushed the law through in the first place. During the
argument, for which the Court once again set aside an entire day,

the tenor of the questioning—especially some questions asked
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist—led us at the challengers
counsel table to feel that we might have a chance to eke out a
narrow 5–4 victory striking down the law. Unfortunately, our
celebrations were quite premature.
In its decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
540 U.S. 93 (2003), a decision with a rare joint co-authorship by
both Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
the majority of the Court—its “liberal” justices—severely watered
down the First Amendment’s protections of political speech
and association in order to uphold the law as a way to deter not
only corruption but also undue access and influence by those

The 1974 law was an
across-the-board effort by
the federal government to
regulate political speech
through limiting and
controlling its funding.
who financially support political parties or make independent
expenditures speaking about politicians. The majority opinion
was the absolute nadir of First Amendment jurisprudence in this
area, giving the government extremely broad powers to regulate
the funding of political speech and association—the most potent
weapon the people have to challenge the government. Talk about
chutzpah. The ruling was cheered by most of the major media,
and why not? Now they would be the only major institutions
with a free hand to use their resources to speak about politicians.
Lucky for those who own a newspaper or a broadcast network.

Citizens United
Of course, the final chapter in our story is yet to come. That is
the case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558
U.S. 310 (2010), certainly the most widely known, though perhaps
least understood, Supreme Court decision of modern times. For
a landmark ruling, it didn’t start out that way. According to the
head of the group, David N. Bossie, Citizens United, a conservative political and cause organization, was not spoiling for a
constitutional fight. Its chutzpah was not that it wanted to set a
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landmark precedent or overturn a prior ruling. What it did want
to do was emulate a liberal iconic storyteller, Michael Moore,
whose 2004 film Fahrenheit 9/11 was a broadside attack against
President George W. Bush, who was up for reelection that year.
Citizens United wanted to do the same thing against Hillary
Clinton, the front-runner for the Democratic Party presidential
nomination in 2008.
The problem was that the law upheld in the McConnell case
seemed to make it a crime and otherwise prevent the group
from doing so because it was a corporation, albeit a nonprofit
like hundreds of thousands of other cause organizations, but the
law made no exception for that. Citizens United might be able
to make the movie, but it could not advertise it on television or

It took the bad kind
of chutzpah for the
government full of
incumbents to pass those
incumbent-protecting,
speech-suppressing
laws in the first place.
show it on demand. It was not even clear Citizens United could
show the film in a movie theater because it politically attacked
then senator Clinton. The group tried to see if there was any
way the Federal Election Commission might approve or make
an exception for the film, but there was not. So Citizens United
really had not set out to bring a landmark case, but in order to
get its movie and its message out, it had to challenge the campaign finance law’s restrictions. When one steps back a moment,
this whole situation should have been, as lawyers say, res ipsa
loquitur. The idea that a group of citizens wanting to make and
distribute a movie critical of a leading presidential candidate
could not do so because the law would not allow that, or could
not do so without seeking the permission or approval of a government agency, seems utterly unreal in a country with a First
Amendment and, supposedly, a culture of free speech. How
could such a classic example of free speech be made a crime?
Citizens United filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that it

could produce and distribute the film Hillary: The Movie without fear of enforcement of the federal campaign finance laws
against it. There were a number of issues raised about whether
nonprofit groups like Citizens United—and the countless counterpart groups like the ACLU and others—could be restricted in
this fashion. The issues would certainly be important for free
speech and criticism of government generally. A lower court
ruled against the group on the ground that the law covered the
film and prevented its distribution.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court in March 2009
and raised the expected issues. But at one pivotal point, Justice
Samuel Alito asked the government’s lawyer whether, under the
government’s theory of the First Amendment and the Court’s
precedents, the law could be used to ban a publishing company
from distributing a book critical of Senator Clinton? When the
government’s lawyer answered “yes,” there was an audible gasp
from members of the audience. Here was the government telling
the Supreme Court that a book could be banned if it criticized a
presidential candidate during an election year and was published
by a corporation. It took nerve to give that answer, but it was consistent with the government’s theory about the need to enforce
the campaign finance laws. Many have speculated that, because
of that answer to that question and the position it espoused, the
Court decided to schedule the case for re-argument. In the reargument, Citizens United’s position would be supported by a
Who’s Who of labor, business, civic, and political organizations
across the political spectrum in America, including the ACLU,
the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, the NRA, and the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
That re-argument in September 2009 had great drama to it,
with some of the top lawyers in the country, like Floyd Abrams,
Ted Olson, then solicitor general Elena Kagan, and former solicitor general Seth Waxman, crossing swords. The same question
about banning books was asked and answered, with a little more
nuance. But the answer was basically the same: yes, the government could ban a book published by a corporation in order to
enforce the law. As the Court’s 5–4 ruling four months later in
January 2010 would indicate, that seemed to be the straw that
broke the back of the government’s theory. It resulted in the
landmark ruling, written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that
independent speech about government and politics could not be
banned or restricted because the speaker was an organization—
be it corporate, nonprofit, or labor—just as it could not be banned
if it came from an individual. The free speech rights and benefits
of the First Amendment had to be available equally to all. There
could be no second-class speakers under our First Amendment;
were the rule otherwise, the Court insisted, then the organized
and established news media, almost all of which are corporate in
form, could be restrained as well, which would be an intolerable
consequence. Despite the fact that the Court explained that it
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was protecting Citizens United in order to protect the New York
Times, most of the major media greeted the decision with furious anger and contempt, not with open arms. But for those of us
who had any role to play—however modest—in bringing about
the Court’s decision and the free speech reasoning behind that
ruling, it was a great day for the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, the ruling was met with an avalanche of protest
and condemnation. It would lead to a corporate takeover of our
government. It would be the death of democracy. And leading
the charge was the president of the United States, who, in his
State of the Union message a few days later, publicly attacked
the decision, with the members of the Court sitting before him
silently. I have never seen a president show such disrespect to
the Supreme Court before. Talk about chutzpah. Of course, that
would set the tone for the relentless media and partisan attacks
on the decision that have not abated even now. During the recent
presidential campaign, Secretary Clinton repeatedly promised—
to great applause each time—not to name anyone to the Supreme
Court who was not prepared to overrule the decision. I thought
litmus tests were improper for Supreme Court appointments and
an undermining of the independence of the judiciary. Let alone
the irony of a leading presidential candidate attacking a decision
that permitted a group of citizens to question her fitness for the
office. More chutzpah, for sure. One of our two major parties’
platforms contained a pledge to seek a constitutional amendment, if necessary, to overrule the decision. The last time there
was a serious effort to overrule a decision protecting free speech
was against the Court’s ruling upholding the First Amendment
right to burn the American flag as an expression of protest. That
proposed amendment was defeated, and this one will be as well,
and with good cause. We do not need a new First Amendment
that repeals the current one. We just need to safeguard and apply
the one we have, which has served America so well for 225 years.
One more recent example of the courage of one’s convictions
in this area involves Shaun McCutcheon, a businessman from
Alabama and dedicated Republican Party supporter. He wanted
to give a number of contributions—each within the legal limit—
to Republican candidates and committees whose principles and
policies he shared and supported. The federal campaign finance
law contained a provision limiting the aggregate amount of such
contributions that any one person could give during an election
season, even though each individual one would be perfectly legal.
The Supreme Court in Buckley had upheld such an aggregate
limit as a way to prevent corruption. But the campaign finance
statutes and regulations had changed since then, and there were
a number of new protections and restrictions to address such
concerns. Building on Citizens United’s questioning of campaign
finance limits, McCutcheon filed suit to challenge the aggregate contribution limits. In another 5–4 ruling, the Supreme
Court agreed with him, declaring that his aggregate financial

support—fully disclosed and each specific contribution within
the law’s limits—was an example of core First Amendment activity no different than marching in a parade or handing out leaflets,
and no less admirable under our constitutional protections of
freedom of speech and association. His chutzpah in bringing
and winning that case paid off as well.

Conclusion
So there it is: From a handful of left-wing antiwar protestors
to an organization of right-wing conservatives to a Republican
businessman, groups and individuals have had the nerve to stand
up and challenge the right of the government to seek to silence
their criticism of those who run the government. It took the
bad kind of chutzpah for the government full of incumbents
to pass those incumbent-protecting, speech-suppressing laws
in the first place, given the meaning and purpose of the First
Amendment, and it took the good kind of chutzpah for all of the
people and groups who took the government to task for violating those principles.
In doing so, they were vindicating the brave words of three
Supreme Court justices of an earlier era who certainly did not
lack chutzpah. In a case in which the government tried to make
it a crime for labor unions to speak out on candidates for office,
Justice William O. Douglas, for himself and Justice Hugo Black
and Chief Justice Earl Warren, put it this way:
Under our Constitution, it is We The People who are sovereign.
The people have the final say. The legislators are their spokesmen. The people determine through their votes the destiny
of the nation. It is therefore important—vitally important—
that all channels of communication be open to them during
every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred,
and that the people have access to the views of every group
in the community.
...
Some may think that one group or another should not express
its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it
advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of lawless action. But these are not justifications for withholding
First Amendment rights from any group—labor or corporate. . . . First Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all
persons and groups in this country. They are not to be dispensed or withheld merely because we or the Congress thinks
the person or group is worthy or unworthy.
United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593, 594 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). q
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